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CoRPoRATIONs-ULTRA VIREs Aars-GIFTS TO EnuCATIONAL lNsnrnTioNs-Plaintiff, a New Jersey corporation, was engaged in the manufacture
and sale of valves, fire hydrants and other special equipment for use in water
and gas industries. The company employed about 300 persons at its plant
in New Jersey. In 1951 the board of directors adopted a resolution appropriating $1,500 as a donation to Princeton University for university maintenance. When this appropriation was questioned by certain stockholders,
the company instituted a declaratory judgment action to determine whether
the proposed donation was ultra vires. The lower court ruled that the
donation was intra vires.1 On appeal, held, affirmed. The gift was intra
vires because it benefited the corporate donor and was authorized by statute.2
A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. 11. Barlow, (N.J. 1953) 98 A. (2d) 581, app. dismissed
346 U.S. 861, 74 S.Ct. 107 (1953).
The principal case represents the only adjudication in recent years of
the validity of corporate gifts to educational institutions. However, because
of the doctrine of personal liability of corporate directors for ultra vires acts,8
the question of the validity of these gifts presents a problem on which inept
legal counsel may bring financial disaster to a corporate director. The limitation imposed by the common law on corporate donations to charitable institutions is that the donation must benefit or promote the corporate purpose.4
Prior to the principal case it was held that a corporate gift to an educational
institution is within the common law limitation when the gift will both

N.J. Super. 106, 97 A. (2d) 186 (1953).
(1937) §14:3-13 provides: "Any corporation ••. may co-operate •.•
in the creation and maintenance of community funds or of charitable, philanthropic or
benevolent instrumentalities conducive to public welfare, and its directors or trustees may
appropriate and expend for these purposes such sum or sums as they deem expedient and
as in their judgment will contribute to the protection of the corporate interests." The
statute limits the expenditure by providing that if an expenditure of 1% of the capital and
surplus as of the end of the preceding year is made, no further expenditure can be made
when 25% of the stockholders object upon notice of the director's intention to make further
expenditures.
8 ST.EVENS, CoRPORATIONS, 2d ed., 723-724 (1949); Fergus Falls Woolen Mills Co.
v. Boyum, 136 Minn. 411, 162 N.w. 516 (1917); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS, rev. ed.,
§65 (1946).
4 6A FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP. §§2939, 2940 (1950); BALLANTINE, CoRPoRATIONs,
rev. ed., §85 (1946); ST.EVENS, CoRPoRATIONs, 2d ed., 248 (1949); Cousens, "How Far
Corporations May Contribute to Charity," 35 VA. L. REv. 401 (1949).
1

2

A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 26

N.J. Rev. Stat.
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enhance the goodwill of the corporation and enable the corporate donor to
secure more highly trained employees.5 Language used by the court in the
principal case indicates that the requirement of the common law rule is
satisfied if the donation contributes to the "actual survival of the corporation
in a free enterprise system."6 It appears that the court in the principal case
has so expanded the common law limitation as to make it no limitation at
all. Many legislatures have enacted statutes which authorize corporations to
donate to charity.7 Although the basis of the holding in the present case
is not entirely clear, it would seem that the court could have rested its decision solely on the New Jersey statute. 8 Thus it is likely that the apparent
expansion of the common law rule in the principal case will not be adopted
in jurisdictions which do not have a similar statute.
Proponents of corporate gifts to education contend that since the wealth
of the country is becoming centered in corporations it is the duty of these
corporations to support educational institutions as individuals have previously
done.9 They argue that such corporate support is necessary to prevent the
transformation of private education into state-dominated education and a consequent impairment of the capitalistic system of free enterprise.10 As a more
specific benefit from these donations, it is contended that the gifts will increase
the supply of well-rounded talent available for management positions, and that

5 Armstrong Cork Co. v. H. A. Meldrum Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1922) 285 F. 58; Evans v.
Brumner, Mond & Co., [1921] 1 Ch. 359.
6 Principal case at 586.
7 The following statutes have been enacted: Ark. Acts (1951) No. 69; Cal. Corp. Code
(Deering, 1953) §802(g); Colo. Stat. Ann. (1953 Supp.) c. 41, §26; Hawaii Sess. Laws
(1947) series c-138; ill. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 32, §157.5(m); Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns,
1948; 1953 Cum. Supp.) §25-2llb; Kan. Stat. (Corrick, 1949; 1951 Supp.) §17-3009;
Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 49, §15, as amended, Me. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 49, §15; Mass.
Gen. Laws (1932) c. 155, §12, as amended by Mass. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 164, as
amended by Mass. Gen. Laws (1946) c. 278; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §450.10; Minn.
Stat. (1949) c. 300.66; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §351.385; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §14:3-13,
as amended, N.J. Cum. Supp. (1950) §14:3-13; N.M. Laws (1951) c. 105; 22 N.Y.
Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1943) §34; N.C. Gen. Stat. (1950) §55-26; Ohio Rev. Code
(Baldwin, 1953) §1702.26; Okla. Stat. (1951) tit. 18, §1.17; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon,
1953 Supp.) tit. 15, §716; Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) §4085, as amended by
Tenn. Laws (1943) c. 881(2); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1349; W.Va.
Code (1949) §3015(3). For an analysis of the application of these statutes to pre-existing
corporations see: 52 HARv. L. Rav. 538 (1939); De Capriles and Garrett, "Legality of
Corporate Support to Education: A Survey of Current Developments," 38 A.B.A.J. 209
(1952); 67 HARv. L. Rav. 343 (1953). There may be a problem of statutory construction
as to whether the proposed object of the gift is within the limits of the statute. See James
McCord Co. v. Citizens' Hotel Co., (Tex. yiv. App. 1926) 287 S.W. 906, where it was
held that the purchase of stock in a hotel was a contribution to a "civic enterprise."
s Note 2 supra.
9 De Capriles and Garrett, "Legality of Corporate Support to Education: A Survey of
Current Developments," 38 A.B.A.J. 209 (1952); Dodd, "For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?" 45 HARv. L. Rav. 1145 (1932); Bleicken, "Corporate Contributions to
Charities: The Modern Rule," 38 A.B.A.J. 999 (1952).
10 De Capriles and Garrett, ''Legality of Corporate Support to Education: A Survey
of Current Developments," 38 A.B.A.J. 209 (1952).
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educated persons constitute a better market than those not so well educated.11
Opponents of corporate gifts to education rely on the more technical argument
that corporations are organized and operated for the benefit of the stockholders only, and that all efforts of the board of directors must be directed
toward that end.12 They feel that corporate gifts to education do not benefit
stockholders as a class. An analysis of these contentions reveals that they
seem to differ only in the degree of directness by which the gift must benefit
the corporate donor. When the question of the validity of a proposed corporate gift to education arises in a state having only the common law rule,
the outer limits of the concept of benefit to or promotion of the corporate
purpose seem to be established by Armstrong Cork Co. v. H. A. Meldrum
Co.,18 which upheld gifts for securing goodwill and trained employees. When
the issue arises in a jurisdiction which has an appropriate statute, necessarily
the language of the statute is decisive; however, it would appear that because
of the present approval of the broad policy behind such statutes the courts
will be liberal when faced with problems of statutory construction. If declaratory judgment procedure is available as in the principal case and the
use of this procedure is financially practical, it would seem advisable to
utilize such procedure in order to protect a corporate director either where
the donation in a common law state goes outside the scope of the rule in Armstrong Cork Co. v. H. A. Meldrum Co. or where there is a close question of
statutory construction as to the proper objects of the donation. 14

Judson M. Werbelow, S.Ed.

11 Bell, "Corporate Support of Education: The Legal Basis,'' 38 A.B.A.J. 119 (1952).
1 2 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919). For a presenta-

tion of this argument see Dodd, ''For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees,'' 45 HAitv.

L. REv. 1145 (1932), where it is predicted that this argument is losing weight and will
lose adherents.
13 Note 5 supra. For a presentation of suggested donative programs which appear to
be within the purview of this rule, see Bell, "Corporate Support of Education: The Legal
Basis," 38 A.B.A.J. 119 (1952).
14 See generally RuML, THE MA=AL OF CoRPORATB GIVING (1952); Am>REws,
CORPORATION GIVING (1952).

